Norm contestation by local actors has emerged in recent years as an explanation for the failure of norm diffusion. This article contributes to the literature on norm contestation by analysing how norms diffused by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pertaining to election observation and free and fair voting are re-constituted and contested by domestic actors in Kazakhstan. The study contributes to the idea of 'constitutive localisation' by emphasising a more fundamental level of disagreement beyond just congruence between the diffused norm and local beliefs; by demonstrating contestation can occur at a later stage in the norm diffusion cycle; by focusing on the micro-politics of contestation by local actors involved in the implementation of diffused norms and; by revealing how norm contestation is not necessarily a process of emancipatory politics, but a strategic act to serve authoritarian consolidation. Utilising a four-fold framework, the analysis illustrates how norms, while initially accepted by Kazakhstani authorities, are reconstituted through political discourse and/or practice creating the moment of contestation. While this contestation is instrumentalised by political elites for their own advantage, it also remains an important element of agency within a normative order in which they had little previous control over.
'Constitutive localisation', the process by which externally diffused policy norms are reinterpreted and re-constituted through local practices and beliefs, has emerged in recent years as an explanation for the limits of norm diffusion.1 Importantly, such accounts have shifted the debate away from a universal and linear understanding of norm diffusion to one centred on norm contestation and the role of local agency in shaping normative orders. In this literature, the contestation of norms by local actors is framed as an emancipatory act that allows scholars to better understand local voices, which in themselves challenge the global liberal order. This article contributes to the literature on norm contestation by analysing how norms diffused by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pertaining to elections and democracy are locally constituted and contested by domestic actors in Kazakhstan.
The OSCE through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) has been committed to promoting democracy and human rights in Kazakhstan since the collapse 2of the USSR and it has done this largely through election observation, among other activities. Despite the OSCE/ODHIR observing numerous elections in Kazakhstan since 1994, the political system has, according to Freedom House and Polity data scores, become less rather than more democratic.2 Kazakhstan has developed a form of post-Soviet authoritarianism centred on the personalistic leadership of its first and only president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Despite regular elections, a formal division of powers and ostensibly the rule of law, parliament is subservient to the president, political opposition is restricted, the judiciary is acquiescent to the executive, civil society is weak and problems persist with regards to human rights violations. The political system corresponds to a form of neopatrimonialism whereby Nazarbayev arbitrates the political and economic interests of competing informal elite networks.3 This illustrates the limits of the OSCE's capacity to shape the normative behaviour of Kazakhstani authorities relating to the principle of fair elections.
This article argues that limitations for norm diffusion in this case are rooted in the micropolitics4 of norm contestation between the OSCE and Kazakhstani political elites and how they re-interpret and re-constitute OSCE/ODHIR norms through local discourse and practice.
While the study builds on the work of existing norm contestation scholars, most notably Amitav Acharya, the argument departs from this literature in four ways: 1) by emphasising a more fundamental level of disagreement between the OSCE and local actors; 2) by demonstrating that contestation can occur at a much later stage in the norm diffusion cycle;
3) by focusing on the micro-politics of contestation by local actors involved in the implementation and interpretation of diffused norms and; 4) by illustrating norm contestation is not just a process of emancipatory politics, but can also be strategic and instrumental act by the recipient to serve the interest of authoritarian reproduction.
Using the principles of election observation and the practice of free and fair voting as examples of norm diffusion, the article introduces a four-stage analytical framework to conceptualise the micro-politics of norm contestation between the OSCE and Kazakhstan.
Firstly, norms are diffused by the OSCE and then secondly accepted by the Kazakhstani government and enshrined in law. In the third stage norms are reconstituted through political discourse (the norm of election observation) and/or political practice (free and fair voting) to meet the perceived particularities of the local context. This creates the final stage -the moment of contestation -where a disconnection between the diffused norm and its practice emerges.
To provide an account of the micro-politics of norm contestation in Kazakhstan the study adopts an interpretive and qualitative research method using in-depth semi-structured interviews with local officials and representatives involved in Kazakhstan's electoral process, along-side an analysis of OSCE/ODHIR reports, Kazakh legislation and media reports.5 The article is divided into three sections. The first offers a theoretical discussion on norm contestation and the limitations of norm diffusion. The second lays out the four-stage analytical framework for studying the micro-politics of norm contestation. The third section analyses external election observation and free and fair voting as illustrations of OSCE diffused norms and applies the four-stage framework to these two examples.
Understanding norm contestation and the limits of norm diffusion
Norms6 in the international context are inherently prescriptive as they are defined by a set of standards where behaviour can be judged as 'appropriate' or 'proper'. Such normative standards are agreed by a wider social community and divergence from the norm 'generates disapproval or stigma, while norm conforming behaviour...produces praise'.7 The diffusion of norms is best defined as 'the transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another'.8 Norm diffusion has become an important function of major international organisations in recent decades.9 Conventional explanations for why norm diffusion fails can be broadly posited within two perspectives.
There are those who adopt a rationalist approach which suggests external norm diffusion fails if organisations omit to establish substantial incentives for norm conformity or costs for norm deviation.10 Alternatively, others argue a favourable domestic context, politically and culturally, is essential for successful norm socialisation.11 In these two approaches the contestation of norms appears in the early stages of the norm diffusion life cycle where a discussion takes place in which the norm entrepreneur seeks compliance from the norm recipient to a normative framework whom in turn may seek to resist or re-interpret the normative order.12 As Deitelhoff and Zimmermann note, this literature makes the assumption that once the norm is established the element of conflict vanishes and local actors internalise norms in a rather uncomplicated manner. 13 The process of contestation does not terminate with adoption of a norm. Norm diffusion is a dynamic process whereby norms are neither universally adopted or understood14 and through discursive and social practice the internalisation of norms remains a contested process. 15 Limitations to norm diffusion, therefore, can arise in situations where the meanings given to This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the contestation of norms in several ways. In line with Acharya, and to some extent the work of Weiner,30 this work argues that in the case of Kazakhstan and the OSCE norm regression occurs because of the reconstitution and reinterpretation of norms at the local level. However, this work departs from the 'localisation' literature on four fronts. Firstly, the extent of disagreement over norms in the Kazakhstani case is more fundamental than simply making 'the outside norm congruent to a pre-existing local normative order'. 31 The disjuncture which occurs in the Kazakhstani case is not simply a re-interpretation of diffused norms regarding elections and democracy on the basis of pre-existing set of local norms, but instead diffused norms are intstrumentalised by local elites through discursive practice as a means of constituting a domestic normative framework (the Kazakh path to democracy) which aids the consolidation of authoritarianism.
Local elites possess agency to re-interpret such norms for their own instrumental purposes, but it is not as if OSCE norms of elections and democracy are being diffused into a normative vacuum. As we will see below, the Kazakh government has had limited agency to shape the OSCE normative framework at the global level (the premise of the OSCE's 'human dimension' was set by antecedent organisations long before Kazakhstan was an independent sovereign state), but it does have agency to re-interpret the diffused norms in the context of domestic political authority, but in doing so it fundamentally challenges the essence of the diffused norm.
Secondly, much of the norm contestation literature centres on higher-level politics -on how norms are reconstituted and re-interpreted at the level of regional politics32 or within the broader international arena at the European or Global level,33 or in relation to UN agendas such as R2P,34 UN peace-building models35 or the EU model of democracy promotion.36
While they seek to introduce local voice and agency, there is a lack of emphasis on what I term the 'micro-politics' of norm contestation. Differently put, there has been a lack of focus on how the actual process of contestation plays out with those actors who are often involved in implementing diffused norms. For the diffusion of norms concerning democracy and elections, this would involve seeking to understand the meaning and re-interpretation of norms by actors in the electoral process and how they understand these norms in the context of the localised normative framework.
Thirdly, a focus on the micro-politics of norm contestation, as this study argues, reveals how norm contestation can take place at a much later stage of the norm diffusion cycle when the reconstituted local variant of a norm encounters the original version in the practice of local political actors. This is in contradistinction to much of the literature which focuses on how norm contestation occurs at an earlier stage in higher-level debates regarding the setting up of regional normative orders such as in the case of Asian regionalism. 37 In other words, a focus on micro-politics necessitates explaining how norm contestation works in practice at the local level.
The final front on which this study departs from existing literature is to challenge the way norm contestation is assumed as a positive process which emancipates the Global South from the global liberal order. This literature is perceived to 'depict contestation as a means to achieve better dialogue and a more legitimate global order'.38 Nevertheless, not all contestation is imbued with emancipatory zeal. Norm contestation does not always lead to a genuine voice for local actors or to their emancipation from dominant global liberal norms.
While Hobson and Kurki have been right to critique the failure of the democracy promotion community to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the multiple conceptualisations of democracy, and the need to take account of localised conceptions of democracy,39 how liberal democracy can be contested by norm recipient states is equally problematic. The contestation of liberal norms can be adopted by authoritarian regimes to legitimate their rule by using discourse and practice to strengthen their political position. By focusing on both the micro-politics of norm contestation, and not observing the process as one of natural emancipation, we can understand better why some norms fall from the international order.40
Framework for analysing the contestation of norms
This article puts forward a four-stage framework for understanding the micro-politics of norm contestation in the case of the OSCE and Kazakhstan. While the framework could be used in other cases, it is set up to the peculiarities of the OSCE and Kazakhstani case. Firstly, a norm is diffused by an external agent. However, in many cases of norm construction (and contestation), as the 'constitutive localisation' literature demonstrates,41 the norm taker can play some role in the construction of norms at higher-level dialogues. In the case of the OSCE and Kazakhstan the country has had limited agency to contribute to norm construction especially in relation to the human dimension of the OSCE agenda.42 Secondly, the recipient country will initially accept the norm and enshrine it in legislation. The third stage concerns the extent to which the norm is then either re-constituted through a public discourse which views the norm as incommensurable with local conditions or through political practice altering the norm to suit local behaviour. This reflects contestation as a form of 'constitutive localisation'43 and discursive practice. 44 In the final stage this creates a disconnect, in other words, the moment of contestation, between the theory of the norm (the initial promotion of the norm in stage one and the acceptance of the norm in stage two) and the practice of the norm (channelled through the discourse or practice of a perceived cultural specificity for the application of the norm).
As a consequence of the four-stage process, the external agent perceives the practice of the norm as a failure of compliance while recipient authorities feel frustrated by the criticism, as in their view they have met the legal terms of the norm but practiced in a specific way related to the cultural conditions on the ground. This leads to disagreement with regards to whether only meeting the specific form of a norm constitutes the spirit of the norm in practice.
Differently put, a state such as Kazakhstan might claim to be 'democratic' on the grounds they possess a constitution with a division of powers and a commitment to procedural electoral democracy, and do so with a locally inflected interpretation of democracy (the Kazakh Way), but in practice the substance of democracy -the fairness of open competition free from the arbitrary influence of the state and regime is absent. In practice, the contestation of norms in this way leads not to a form of liberation from the Global North, but rather as we can observe below it helps consolidate an authoritarian regime.
Table 1. to go here
The remainder of this article will utilise this framework (table 1.) to study the micro politics of norm contestation in relation to two norms diffused by OSCE/ODHIR: the principles of election monitoring and free and fair voting procedures. This perceived incommensurability between the particularities of the local context with OSCE/ODHIR norms is then transposed into the second part of the discourse which centres on the selectivity of election observers in terms of the application of norms in specific country cases. For instance, Nazarbayev has often expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the OSCE is only interested in the human dimension of the OSCE's activities (i.e. protecting human rights, elections etc.) rather than issues of material security such as fighting terrorism and the drug trade.52 This feeds down to a discourse which claims the OSCE/ODHIR practices double standards and is selective in how election observers apply its perception of whether the country meets certain standards. There is a tendency to understand the OSCE as being too flexible in cases where other countries have similar electoral practices to Kazakhstan. For example, Belarus is evoked as a country in which OSCE/ODHIR final election reports were less critical than those of Kazakhstan's, despite both countries suffering similar problems such as electoral fraud, executive interference and an inequitable media environment for opposition candidates.53 This is then characterised as a form of double standards on the part of the OSCE/ODHIR EOMs.54 Ex-Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin argued that 'the OSCE should avoid double standards and adjust its structure; only to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of international standards will it achieve confidence... It is important to get rid of accusations regarding the organization of its selectivity and double standards'.55 A further example is how one election official noted how 'Poland, the country which hosts the headquarters of the OSCE, does not even allow international election observers into polling stations', but in Kazakhstan they were expected to.56
Stage 4: the moment of contestation
The consequence of this perceived incommensurability and double standards is that OSCE/ODHIR election observation is challenged, the expertise of OSCE/ODHIR observers is questioned and EOMs undermined. It creates the moment of contestation. For example, one local election official stressed that observers, 'could not distinguish Pakistan from Kazakhstan…have little knowledge of the country…and behave disrespectfully'. 57 The issue of discourteous behaviour was also raised by a member of Kazakhstan's Central Election Commission (CEC) who noted that at specific polling precincts election observers had not mentioned any irregularities to the chairman of the polling stations and only listed problems with the voting process after the fact. 58 The validity of recommendations made by EOMs is also brought into question as they are accused of only being 'interested in scandal or provocations'.59 Furthermore, it is considered EOMs should be 'more benevolent and have a more humanistic attitude' to Kazakhstan's electoral process.60
This questioning of the election observation process serves to contest the principle of election observation so that ultimately in the eyes of participants, 'observers have lost their necessity… and are not needed anymore'.61 Indeed, the president has even gone as far to suggest that Kazakhstan could refuse OSCE/ODHIR EOMs in future. 62 The principle of international election observation of Kazakhstan's electoral process has moved from acceptance to being refracted through a discourse which situates the norm in dissonance with cultural conditions and then to outright contestation. This is a level of disagreement beyond the seeking to make norms congruent with local conditions. The discourse of the 'Kazakh Path to Democracy' in fact marks a fundamental challenge to the OSCE/ODHIR normative framework pertaining to elections.
Stages 1 and 2: Diffusion and acceptance of the norm of Free and Fair Voting Procedures: election commissions
The Copenhagen Document also commits signatories to holding 'free elections that will be 
Stage 3: reconstitution of the norm of free and fair voting
The norm of free and fair voting, through balanced election commissions, has undergone significant 'constitutive localisation'. This is a process whereby rules pertaining to the election of commissions are changed in response to requests from the OSCE, but then further adapted to meet perceived local conditions which are underpinned by loyalty and patronage. The practice of falsifying elections is systematic and its roots lay in the executive control of election commissions. In the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections, documents were leaked which seem to show how the administrative command system worked. The documents detailed how the Department of Health were ordered to arrange for a 100 percent turnout for employees and how at the Kazakh National Technical University in Almaty students were to be organised from 7 in the morning for orderly voting.86 It was also noted how teachers would be punished if they did not guarantee 100 percent turnout.87 Election commission oversight of the voting counting process is also understood to be poorly conducted.
OSCE/ODHIR reports are littered with examples from election observers with regards to instances where ballot papers were placed in the incorrect pile (typically they were added to the pile for the president or Nur Otan) or other types of violations of vote counting procedures such as obscuring the counting process from observers, the presence of Nur Otan representatives and other unauthorised personnel such as the police and local authority officials at the vote count and the failure to cross check voting tabulations. 88 The former leader of the Auyl (village) party, Gani Kaliev also alluded to these issues claiming the 'process was hidden' and that his party's representatives 'were not allowed to observe the vote counting process'.89
The dominance of pro-regime representatives at all levels of elections commissions ensures the norm of free and fair voting is severely contested in practice. While there is acceptance of the norm, its translation in practice is undone by executive control. The Karusel, ballot stuffing, absentee voting and pressure on state employees to produce 100 percent turnout for their institutions leads to incredible official voter turnout in some cases close to 100 percent.
Again, this is not simply the congruence of international norms to local practice, but rather the loyalty and patronage which underpins the electoral process in Kazakhstan represents an indisputable challenge to OSCE/ODHIR norms pertaining to elections and democracy. The overarching implication of the undermining of the principle of free and fair voting in Kazakhstan is not the contestation of an international norm seemingly celebrating the Global South breaking from the shackles of a Western-imposed normative order, but instead the steady consolidation of an authoritarian regime. The manipulation of election commissions by local executives undermines the practice of multi-party composition on such commissions. Dominated by pro-presidential members, election commissions at every level of the electoral process from individual polling stations up to the CEC, carry out forms of political behaviour which significantly skew the vote in favour of the president or Nur Otan. Over the last ten years at least this has led to the further centralisation of power in Nazarbayev as an individual and his overall grip of the political system.90 The discourse and practice of the these locally constituted norms pertaining to elections and democracy have only further embedded the power of Nazarbayev through thumping election victories which did not meet international standards and were subject to electoral engineering.
Concluding discussion
A focus on micro-politics in the case of Kazakhstan and the OSCE brings much needed attention to how local actors, not just governments, receive and re-constitute norms diffused by external agents.91 It also revealed how contestation can occur at a much later stage in the norm diffusion cycle, with a much more fundamental level of disagreement beyond a lack of congruence, and that contestation at the micro-level is not necessarily a form of emancipation from the Global North, but instead can aid the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. This study has detailed how contestation occurs because agents within the electoral process undermine formal acceptance of a norm in a strategic effort to ensure their interests are met.
Local actors interpret norms to ensure they are congruent with an existing discourse or practice to safeguard their political position, but this interpretation fundamentally challenges and undermines the norm being difused. This process consists of local actors firstly parroting a discourse emanating from above regarding the Kazakh path of democracy which is viewed as incommensurable with OSCE/ODHIR norms and secondly, guaranteeing their position by demonstrating loyalty to the president by ensuring election commissions are staffed with loyal lieutenants whereby electoral fraud takes place unsanctioned.
The extent to which, however, both the discourse of the Kazakh path of democracy, and the practice of election management, represent an alternative normative framework and a demonstration of agency remains unclear. Focusing on the latter stage of the norm contestation cycle, however, can help clarify. The Kazakhstani government's agency in relation to setting the normative agenda for democracy and elections within the OSCE is stymied by not just being a less well-established actor, but also by the fact that when the Copenhagen Document was written the country was not officially an independent state. It had to accept the terms of the document with little agency to influence those terms. Kazakhstani political actors can mostly only influence OSCE/ODHIR norms to any great effect after their diffusion, acceptance and legislation. Thus, the demonstration of local Kazakhstani agency and norm contestation pertaining to elections and democracy occurs much later in the norm diffusion cycle. While this contestation is instrumentalised by political elites for their own advantage, it also remains an important aspect of their agency within a normative order in which they have had previous little control over. Kazakhstan, is the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. 1 Acharya, "How Norms Spread", 2Kazakhstan's Polity score has dropped from -2 in 1990 to its current score of -6. In 2003 Kazakhstan's 'Nations in Transit' score for Freedom House was 6.17 for democracy. By 2013 this was 6.57, meaning the country was considered by the organisation as a consolidated authoritarian regime.
